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Restoring Fourth Amendment
Privacy Protection to Automobiles
It is difficult to imagine life without the automobile.  In manyparts of the country, it is our primary, if not sole, means of
transporting ourselves and our property.  It has also become the
“personal effect” in which we have the least claim to an expecta-
tion of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.  Pursuant to Car-
roll v. United States ,1 law enforcement officers may conduct a
warrantless search of an automobile, including closed containers
within,2 whenever there is probable cause to believe that the ve-
hicle contains contraband or evidence.3 New York v. Belton4
permits the police to conduct a warrantless search of the “passen-
ger area” of the vehicle upon the arrest of a recent occupant of
the vehicle, even in the absence of probable cause to believe that
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.  The author wishes to
thank Pepperdine University for its generous support of this Article and Daniel L.
Coats for his excellent research assistance.  In addition, the author is indebted to
John P. Doyle and Wendy McGuire Coats for their helpful comments.
1 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
2 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (authorizing a search of
containers within an automobile if there is probable cause to believe that the auto-
mobile contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity and the container is ca-
pable of concealing the contraband or evidence).
3 See Carroll , 267 U.S. at 156.
4 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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the car contains any contraband or evidence.5  It is not an over-
simplification to state that Belton  and Carroll  have severely com-
promised the protections of the Fourth Amendment with respect
to automobiles.
This Article will examine both the Belton  and Carroll  rules
and will suggest a way to restore our Fourth Amendment privacy
interest in our automobiles without compromising legitimate law
enforcement interests.  Part I will reexamine the Belton  rule and
consider the merits of abolishing it in favor of the more general
rules governing searches incident to arrest and the Carroll  auto-
mobile exception.  Part II will urge a refinement to the Carroll
rule that will favor the occupants’ privacy interests while still re-
specting the legitimate needs of law enforcement.  Part III will
conclude by arguing that our expectation of privacy in our auto-
mobiles can be restored through abolishing the Belton  rule and
modifying Carroll .
I
WHY BELTON NEEDS TO RIDE INTO THE SUNSET
A well-recognized, although limited, exception to the search
warrant requirement is the search incident to arrest.  While ini-
tially more broadly construed,6 the Supreme Court narrowed the
scope of this exception in Chimel v. California  so that it was tai-
lored to the twin rationales justifying the exception:  officer
safety and preservation of evidence.7  That is to say, a search inci-
dent to arrest without probable cause is allowed to protect the
arresting officers from being harmed by the arrestee and to pro-
tect against the potential destruction of evidence by the arres-
tee.8  Because the search incident to arrest is justified by these
twin needs, Chimel  limited the scope of a search incident to ar-
rest to the area within the “immediate control” of the arrestee—
i.e., the area from which he could reach for a weapon or evidence
of his criminal activity.9  This limitation on the scope of a search
incident to arrest necessarily calls for a case-by-case factual de-
termination, because it is dependent on several factors, including
5 Id.  at 460.
6 See, e.g. , United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1950) (upholding
search of arrestee’s place of business when he was arrested therein), overruled in
part by  Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969).
7 395 U.S. at 762-63.
8 Id.
9 Id.  at 763.
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whether and how the arrestee is restrained, the nature of the area
surrounding the arrestee, and the actual distance between the ar-
restee and the area to be searched.
In the 1981 case of New York v. Belton ,10 the Court seized the
opportunity to create a bright-line rule governing searches inci-
dent to arrest when it decided the legality of the search incident
to the arrest of an occupant of a vehicle.11  That decision has
been the subject of much criticism by academics12 and, recently,
by members of the Court and other judges.  In 2004, three Su-
preme Court Justices with decidedly different perspectives on the
law of search and seizure suggested that the Belton  rule is unsat-
isfactory,13 and two other Supreme Court Justices expressed disa-
greement with the expansion of the Belton  rule.14  The unease
that five members of the Court expressed concerning the Belton
rule and its progeny is a strong signal that this is a rule whose
days are numbered.
A. The Belton Decision
On April 9, 1978, a New York state trooper stopped a speeding
vehicle with four men inside.15  In the course of the initial stop,
the trooper detected the odor of burnt marijuana and saw an en-
velope labeled “Supergold” on the floor of the vehicle.16  After
ordering the men out of the car, the trooper searched the passen-
ger compartment as well as the zippered pockets of a jacket
10 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
11 Id.  at 459-60 (establishing a “workable rule” for a category of cases where
“courts have found no workable definition of ‘the area within the immediate control
of the arrestee’”).
12 See, e.g. , 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:  A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 7.1 (4th ed. 2004); Leslie A. Lunney, The (Inevitably Arbi-
trary) Placement of Bright Lines: Belton and Its Progeny , 79 TUL. L. REV. 365, 390-
97 (2004); Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason:  An Empirical Reexami-
nation of Chimel and Belton, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 657, 696-97; David S. Rudstein,
Belton Redux:  Reevaluating Belton’s Per Se Rule Governing the Search of an Auto-
mobile Incident to Arrest , 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1287, 1312-22 (2005); David S.
Rudstein, The Search of an Automobile Incident to an Arrest:  An Analysis of New
York v. Belton, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 205, 244-47 (1984).
13 See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring in part) (expressing dissatisfaction with the Belton  rule, noting Belton ’s shaky
foundation); id.  at 625-33 (Scalia & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
These views are discussed in more detail infra  notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
14 See Thornton , 541 U.S. at 633-36 (Stevens & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
15 Belton , 453 U.S. at 455.
16 Id.  at 455-56.
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found therein, which yielded cocaine.17  While adhering to the
twin justifications for search incident to arrest articulated by
Chimel— removal of any weapons accessible to the arrestee and
prevention of the concealment or destruction of evidence18—the
Court declared the need for a straightforward rule to decide “the
proper scope of a search of the interior of an automobile incident
to a lawful custodial arrest of its occupants.”19  Citing the need of
the individual to know the scope of his constitutional protection,
the need of the policeman to know the scope of his authority,
and the difficulties faced by courts discerning what area is within
the immediate control of an arrestee when an arrestee has been
the recent occupant of an automobile, the Belton  majority de-
clared a bright-line rule that permitted the search of the passen-
ger compartment of the automobile, as well as all containers
therein, upon the arrest of an occupant.20
Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion, which was joined by Jus-
tice Marshall, recognized that the Belton  majority, in creating a
bright-line rule, had expanded searches incident to the arrest of a
recent occupant of an automobile beyond what can be supported
by the twin justifications underlying Chimel .21  Justice Brennan
noted “that at the time Belton and his three companions were
placed under custodial arrest—which was after  they had been re-
moved from the car, patted down, and separated—none of them
could have reached the jackets that had been left on the back
seat of the car.”22  The temporal and spatial limitations made im-
portant by the justifications for the Chimel  rule were now cast off
in favor of a bright-line rule entitling an officer to search the pas-
senger compartment any time an officer arrests a recent occupant
of a vehicle, irrespective of whether the arrestee had any part of
the automobile’s passenger area within his immediate control at
the time of the search.
Justice Stevens concurred in the result in Belton23  and referred
to his dissenting opinion in a companion case, Robbins v. Califor-
17 Id.
18 Id.  at 457.
19 Id.  at 459.
20 Id. at 460.
21 Id.  at 468 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22 Id.  at 466.
23 Id.  at 463 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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nia .24  In his Robbins  dissent, Justice Stevens noted that both
Robbins  and Belton  involved searches of automobiles for which
the officers conducting the search had probable cause to believe
that the vehicles contained contraband.25  Based upon this proba-
ble cause, he expressed his belief that the searches performed in
Robbins  and Belton  should have been upheld under the automo-
bile exception.26  In stating his preference to decide Belton  under
the automobile exception (which requires probable cause to
search) rather than as an automatic search incident to arrest
(which does not require probable cause to search), Justice Ste-
vens noted that Belton ’s rule was achieved by “an extraordinarily
dangerous detour” that creates a new rationale justifying auto-
mobile searches for every lawful custodial arrest of an automo-
bile’s occupant.27  He added:
By taking the giant step of permitting searches in the absence
of probable cause, the Court misses the shorter step of relying
on the automobile exception to uphold the search.  By taking
this shorter step the Court could have adhered to the funda-
mental distinction between a search that a magistrate could
authorize because it is based on probable cause and one that is
not so justified under that standard.  Although I am persuaded
that the Court has reached the right result, its opinion miscon-
strues the Fourth Amendment.28
Thus, the Belton  bright-line rule was soundly criticized by the
dissenting Justices and one concurring Justice—and the concerns
underlying those criticisms have come home to roost.
24 453 U.S. 420, 444 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting), overruled by  United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).
25 Id.  In Robbins , the search was conducted under the automobile exception and
involved the opening of a container.  The plurality in Robbins  relied upon Arkansas
v. Sanders , 442 U.S. 753 (1979), and United States v. Chadwick , 433 U.S. 1 (1977),
which permitted the warrantless seizure of a container suspected to contain contra-
band but required a warrant to search the container, to invalidate the search of
containers during the course of automobile exception search. Robbins , 453 U.S. at
424-25. Chadwick  and Sanders  have since been respectively abrogated and over-
ruled by California v. Acevedo , 500 U.S. 565, 579-80 (1991).  In Acevedo , the Court
clarified that police may search an automobile and containers located within it
where they have probable cause to believe the automobile or its containers contain
evidence of criminal activity. Acevedo , 500 U.S. at 574.
26 Robbins , 453 U.S. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  It is now clear, in light of the
holding in Acevedo , that the Belton  search would be upheld today under the auto-
mobile exception. See supra  note 25 and accompanying text.
27 Robbins , 453 U.S. at 449-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
28 Id.  at 452-53 (footnote omitted).
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B. The Aftermath of  Belton
Despite the majority’s claim to have drawn a bright line for law
enforcement and citizens, Belton  left a number of issues open.
Several of these issues were foreseen in Justice Brennan’s dis-
senting opinion.29  The open questions arising from Belton  that
have challenged courts include:  How much time after arrest may
the search be conducted?30  Must the suspect still be near the
car,31 or even at the scene of arrest,32 when the actual search oc-
29 See  New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 469-70 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(questioning whether the car could be searched incident to arrest five minutes or
three hours after the suspect had left the car, and whether the suspect needed to be
standing in close proximity to the car during the search).
30 While the Supreme Court has stated that a search is not incident to arrest “if
the ‘search is remote in time or place from the arrest,’” United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)),
lower courts have differed greatly in their application of this principle.  Lower courts
routinely approve automobile searches incident to arrest if they are conducted im-
mediately after arrest. See United States v. Barnes, 374 F.3d 601, 603 (8th Cir. 2004)
(upholding search conducted immediately after arrest); United States v. Snook, 88
F.3d 605, 606 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding search conducted five minutes after arrest).
Some courts have allowed searches incident to arrest after a significant amount of
time has passed since the arrest. See United States v. Hrasky, 453 F.3d 1099, 1103
(8th Cir. 2006) (upholding search conduct conducted sixty minutes after arrest as
contemporaneous because the search was the “culmination of a continuing series of
events”), petition for cert. filed , 75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2006) (No. 06-827);
United States v. Fiala, 929 F.2d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding search conducted
ninety minutes after arrest where arrestee remained on the scene).  But other courts
have been stricter with respect to timing. See  United States v. $639,558 in U.S. Cur-
rency, 955 F.2d 712, 715-18 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (determining that “thirty minutes”
long was too “remote in time” to be incident to arrest) (quoting Chimel v. Califor-
nia, 395 U.S. 752, 764 (1969)); United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 787-88 (9th Cir.
1987) (holding that search performed thirty to forty-five minutes after arrest was too
remote in time).
31 Several courts have approved the search incident to arrest of an automobile
notwithstanding that the suspect has been handcuffed and placed inside a police
cruiser. See Hrasky , 453 F.3d at 1102 (upholding search incident to arrest where
arrestee was handcuffed and placed in patrol car sixty minutes prior to search);
Barnes , 374 F.3d at 604 (upholding search incident to arrest where arrestee was
handcuffed and placed in patrol car prior to search); United States v. Humphrey,
208 F.3d 1190, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding search valid “without regard to the fact
that the search occurred after [the arrestee] had been restrained”).  Other courts
have invalidated the search of a vehicle incident to arrest because the defendant had
been handcuffed and placed in a patrol car prior to the search. See, e.g. , United
States v. Edwards, 242 F.3d 928, 938 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding warrantless search of
vehicle invalid where suspect was arrested “100-150 feet away from the car, and he
was handcuffed in the back of a police vehicle at the time of the search”).
32 While some courts have invalidated Belton  searches after the arrestee is no
longer at the scene, see, e.g. , United States v. Lugo, 978 F.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir.
1992) (holding warrantless search invalid where conducted after arrestee had been
taken from the scene), others have upheld such searches, see, e.g., United States v.
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curs?  What is meant by the “passenger compartment” of the au-
tomobile, particularly when the automobile involved is a station
wagon, minivan, hatchback, SUV, or other vehicle in which the
“luggage area” is not physically distinct from the passenger
area?33  And does the bright-line rule permitting searches of
“containers” within the “passenger area” include searches of
locked luggage, a locked glove box, or the space within the door
panels of the vehicle, notwithstanding that the interior of these
containers may not be accessible to the arrestee?34
In view of all of these unanswered questions, one might fairly
ask whether the more flexible, albeit less definite, Chimel  rule is
actually easier for law enforcement officers to apply, particularly
when its application is guided by the justifications for a search
incident to arrest.  Several commentators have so suggested.35
1. Belton Becomes More Dangerous
A number of decisions in the wake of Belton  have increased
the rule’s capacity for mischief.  One such decision, Knowles v.
McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 890-91, 893 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding search by one
officer while another officer transported arrestee to jail); accord United States v.
Johnson, 114 F.3d 435 (4th Cir. 1997).
33 The rule that has emerged after numerous decisions concerning station wagons,
minivans, SUVs, and hatchbacks is that areas accessible to occupants without exiting
the vehicle are searchable as part of the passenger area within the meaning of Bel-
ton . See, e.g. , United States v. Olguin-Rivera, 168 F.3d 1203, 1205-07 (10th Cir.
1999) (upholding search of SUV cargo area incident to arrest where cargo area was
separated from passenger area by a “built-in, vinyl cover”); United States v. Lacey,
86 F.3d 956, 971 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding search of entire van incident to arrest);
United States v. Doward, 41 F.3d 789, 794 (1st Cir. 1994) (upholding search of un-
covered hatchback incident to arrest); United States v. Pino, 855 F.2d 357, 364 (6th
Cir. 1988) (upholding search of rear section of station wagon incident to arrest).
34 While some courts permit Belton  searches of locked containers, see, e.g. ,
United States v. Thomas, 11 F.3d 620, 628 (6th Cir. 1993) (upholding search of
locked firebox incident to arrest where firebox was found on front passenger seat),
others have taken the opposite approach, see, e.g. , State v. Stroud, 720 P.2d 436, 441
(Wash. 1986) (requiring warrant to unlock or search containers found in vehicles
during search incident to arrest under WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7).  Most courts have
permitted Belton  searches of a locked glove box.  See, e.g. , United States v. Woody,
55 F.3d 1257, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding search of locked glove box to be reasona-
ble); State v. Fry, 388 N.W.2d 565, 575 (Wis. 1986) (“We do not construe Belton  as
making a distinction between a locked glove compartment and an unlocked one.”).
However, at least one court has refused to permit the search of a locked glove box as
a matter of state law. See Stroud , 720 P.2d at 441.  Further, the court in Barnes
permitted officers to search the area immediately under the window seal, although it
noted that Belton  would not permit the removal of a door panel. Barnes , 374 F.3d
at 604-05.
35 See sources cited supra note 12.
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Iowa ,36 initially appeared to limit the use of Belton  in automo-
bile stops.  However, its actual effect may be to encourage Belton
searches.
At issue in Knowles  was the constitutional validity of a “search
incident to citation,” a procedure authorized by Iowa law.37  The
petitioner had been stopped for speeding, after which an Iowa
police officer issued a citation rather than arresting him.38  The
officer then conducted a search of the vehicle and discovered a
“pot pipe” and bag of marijuana under the driver’s seat.39  Not-
ing that the twin justifications for a search incident to arrest—
officer safety and preservation of evidence—were absent in this
scenario,40 the Court invalidated the search.41  Thus, the line was
drawn:  an officer lacks authority to search a vehicle incident to
arrest in the absence of an actual arrest.
But is it all that difficult to justify arresting an occupant of an
automobile?  The Court answered that question in the negative
three years after Knowles  was decided when it was called upon in
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista42  to consider the validity of an ar-
rest for a minor infraction.  The petitioner, Gail Atwater, was
pulled over for driving in violation of Texas seatbelt laws; neither
Ms. Atwater nor her young children were restrained as required
by law.43  Notwithstanding that the maximum punishment for
that offense was a mere $50 fine, the officer arrested Ms.
Atwater.44  Although noting that the arrest and its attendant inci-
dents, which apparently did not include a vehicle search, “were
merely gratuitous humiliations imposed by a police officer who
36 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
37 Id.  at 114-15.  Iowa’s statute granted officers the ability to either arrest or issue
a citation following a traffic violation. Id. at 115.  The statute specifically stated that
the officer’s decision to cite rather than to arrest did not affect the officer’s authority
to conduct an otherwise lawful search, which the Iowa Supreme Court concluded
included a full-blown search incident to arrest. Id.
38 Id.  at 114.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 116-17.  The Court emphasized that the fleeting contact between officer
and passenger did not justify a full-blown search incident to arrest, although it could
justify ordering the suspect out of the vehicle, which might lead to reasonable suspi-
cion to justify a frisk. Id.  at 117-18.  Further, the Court stressed that the need to
preserve evidence cannot justify the search incident to a speeding citation because
there would not be any additional evidence of the traffic offense. Id.  at 118.
41 Id.  at 119.
42 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
43 Id. at 323-24.
44 Id.
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was (at best) exercising extremely poor judgment,”45 the Court
nonetheless held that “[i]f an officer has probable cause to be-
lieve that an individual has committed even a very minor crimi-
nal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth
Amendment, arrest the offender.”46 Atwater , read in conjunc-
tion with Knowles , informs law enforcement authorities that,
should they want to search the passenger area of a vehicle relying
on the search incident to arrest doctrine, they must actually make
a custodial arrest, but they may make that custodial arrest even
for very minor offenses committed in their presence.
But does the Fourth Amendment provide any check on pretex-
tual arrests made because an officer is really just interested in
searching the vehicle?  Unfortunately, the answer appears to be
no.  In Whren v. United States ,47 the Court made it clear that the
actual subjective intentions of a police officer in seizing an indi-
vidual play no role in probable cause analysis under the Fourth
Amendment.48  Therefore, since the Belton  rule was first articu-
lated in 1981, the Court has adopted rules that will now permit
an officer seeking to search a vehicle—but lacking the probable
cause needed to justify an automobile search—to arrest an occu-
pant, even for a minor traffic offense, after which he may make a
warrantless search of the interior of the vehicle.  While it would
be irrational to think that law enforcement personnel will begin
to routinely arrest drivers for minor traffic offenses merely be-
cause they are interested in searching the interior of a car but
lack probable cause to do so, it would also be naive to assume
that this never occurs.  Moreover, certain ethnic groups, along
with drivers of vehicles in the “wrong” part of town, will likely
bear a disproportionately greater likelihood of this occurring.
2. Thornton’s Tentative Call for Reform
In 2004, the Supreme Court tackled one of the more difficult
issues that courts had grappled with in the wake of Belton :
whether the Belton  search applies to situations in which the of-
ficer first makes contact with the arrestee after the arrestee has
45 Id.  at 346-47.
46 Id.  at 354.
47 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
48 Id.  at 814 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows
certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever  the subjective
intent.”).
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stepped out of his vehicle.49  In Thornton,  an officer’s suspicions
were aroused when the petitioner seemed to be slowing down to
avoid the officer.50  Upon running a check of the petitioner’s li-
cense plates, the officer determined that the plates had been is-
sued for a vehicle other than the car on which they were
located.51  However, before the officer could pull him over, peti-
tioner drove into a parking lot and got out of his car.52  The of-
ficer pulled his patrol car behind the petitioner, accosted him,
and asked for his driver’s license.53  Petitioner appeared nervous,
but granted permission for the officer to pat him down, at which
point the officer felt a bulge in petitioner’s pocket.54  Petitioner
admitted to possessing illegal drugs and reached into his pocket
and removed several bags of illegal drugs.55 After  the officer
handcuffed petitioner and placed him in the backseat of the pa-
trol car, the officer searched petitioner’s car and discovered a
handgun.56
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority including Jus-
tices Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and, in pertinent part,
O’Connor, held that “[s]o long as an arrestee is the sort of ‘re-
cent occupant’ of a vehicle such as petitioner was here, officers
may search that vehicle incident to the arrest.”57  Justice Stevens,
joined by Justice Souter, dissented, noting that “[t]he bright-line
rule crafted in Belton  is not needed for cases in which the arres-
tee is first accosted when he is a pedestrian, because Chimel  itself
provides all the guidance that is necessary.”58  Far more interest-
ing, however, are the concurring opinions of Justice Scalia, joined
by Justice Ginsburg, and of Justice O’Connor.  These three jus-
tices—one reputedly a conservative (Scalia), one reputedly a lib-
eral (Ginsburg), and one usually considered to be a moderate
(O’Connor)—each expressed dissatisfaction with the Belton  rule
49 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 617 (2004).
50 Id. The officer suspected that the petitioner knew he was a police officer even
though the officer drove an unmarked police car.  Id.






57 Id.  at 623-24.
58 Id.  at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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as it has evolved.59
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg, called for a radical
revision to the Belton  rule governing automobile searches.  His
opinion first pointed out that the twin justifications for searches
incident to arrest—“to find weapons the arrestee might use or
evidence he might conceal or destroy”60—will almost never be a
genuine concern because of the prevalent practice of restraining
an arrestee prior to searching the automobile recently vacated by
the arrestee.61  Quoting Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen Trott, Jus-
tice Scalia strongly repudiated the Belton  rule and its progeny:
In our search for clarity, we have now abandoned our constitu-
tional moorings and floated to a place where the law approves
of purely exploratory searches of vehicles during which of-
ficers with no definite objective or reason for the search are
allowed to rummage around in a car to see what they might
find.62
A fairly typical example of police rummaging in a car to see
what they may find is seen in the fact pattern of Knowles v.
Iowa .63  The search in that case, which was later invalidated be-
cause there had not been an actual arrest,64 was preceded by a
speeding citation:  the driver was clocked driving forty-three mph
in a twenty-five mph zone.65  The opinion offers no indication
that the police officer had any reason to believe that a search of
the vehicle would uncover anything lawfully seizable.  But after a
rather thorough search to see what he might find, the officer got
lucky and found a bag of marijuana and a “pot pipe” stashed
under the driver’s seat.66
In Thornton , Justice Scalia proposed to limit Belton  searches
by reviving a rule that had been expressly repudiated by the
Court, but limiting this “revival” to situations involving automo-
biles.67  Specifically, Justice Scalia urged a return to the rationale
59 Id.  at 624 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part); id.  at 625-32 (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment).
60 Id.  at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
61 Id.  at 628.
62 Id.  (quoting United States v. McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 1999)
(Trott, J., concurring)).
63 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
64 Id.  at 117-19.
65 Id.  at 114.
66 Id.
67 Thornton , 541 U.S. at 631-32 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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of United States v. Rabinowitz ,68 which permitted an automatic
search incident to arrest of the premises in which the suspect had
been arrested, justifying the search as in furtherance of the gov-
ernment’s interest in gathering evidence relevant to the crime for
which the suspect was arrested.69  Under Justice Scalia’s formula-
tion, if Belton  searches are justifiable, it is only because the vehi-
cle might contain evidence relevant to the crime for which the
occupant was arrested.
In 1969, the Court expressly repudiated the rule of Rabinowitz
when it decided Chimel v. California .70  After spelling out that a
search incident to arrest is justified to prevent the arrestee from
gaining access to evidence that could be destroyed or a weapon
that could be used against the officer, the Court limited the
search incident to arrest to the area within the suspect’s immedi-
ate control.71  In ruling as it did, the Court made clear that it was
rejecting the rule articulated in Rabinowitz :
There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely
searching any room other than that in which an arrest oc-
curs—or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk
drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.
Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions,
may be made only under the authority of a search warrant.72
The message of Chimel  is clear:  the search incident to arrest is
not justifiable merely because the premises might contain evi-
dence relevant to the crime for which the suspect was arrested.  If
that is the reason for the search, rather than concerns about
whether the suspect can gain access to a weapon or evidence that
he could then destroy, the right to lawfully search requires prob-
able cause and a warrant or an exception to the warrant require-
ment other than the search incident to arrest.  Thus, contrary to
Justice Scalia’s assertion that “both Rabinowitz  and Chimel  are
plausible accounts of what the Constitution requires,”73 Chimel
directly repudiated the rule in Rabinowitz .
To be fair, Justice Scalia does not advocate in his concurrence
that the Court replace Chimel  with a return to the Rabinowitz
68 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
69 Id.  at 60-61.
70 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969).
71 Id.
72 Id.  at 763.
73 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 631 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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rule.  Instead, his opinion urges that Belton  be recast as a proper
search incident to arrest tied to the Rabinowitz  rule rather than
to the Chimel  rule.74  In support of this approach, he refers to
motor vehicles as a type of “effect” that gives rise to a reduced
expectation of privacy and heightened law enforcement needs.75
He does not, however, explain why this special status of automo-
biles justifies applying to automobiles the Rabinowitz  analysis
that the Court has expressly rejected.
Despite its shortcomings, the approach proposed by Justice
Scalia does at least have the merit of limiting unjustifiable “rum-
maging” through automobiles under the auspices of Belton .  For
example, it would disallow the search of a vehicle in the absence
of a possibility of finding evidence relevant to the crime for
which the vehicle’s occupant was arrested.  Thus, an arrest for
speeding or driving without a license would not permit a search
of an automobile.  Justice Scalia’s approach therefore restricts an
officer inclined to make an arrest for a traffic offense as a pretext
to gain authority to search a vehicle.
Justice O’Connor, in her concurring opinion in Thornton , ex-
pressed her dissatisfaction with the state of the law surrounding
Belton  searches and noted in particular that the search of a vehi-
cle incident to the arrest of its occupant has become a police enti-
tlement rather than an exception justified by the twin rationales
of Chimel .76  Although she expressed her view that the approach
taken by Justice Scalia seemed to be on firmer ground than Bel-
ton ’s shaky foundation, she declined to adopt that approach in
the absence of argument thereon by the parties.77
Judges on other courts have expressed dissatisfaction with Bel-
ton , including several federal judges in post-Thornton cases.78  In
addition, even prior to Thornton , several states had rejected or
74 See id.
75 Id.
76 Id.  at 624 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part).
77 Id.  at 624-25.
78 See  United States v. Weaver, 433 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[W]here the
arrestee was handcuffed and secured in a patrol car before police conducted the
search, the rational underpinnings of Belton—officer safety and preservation of evi-
dence—are not implicated. . . . We respectfully suggest that the Supreme Court may
wish to re-examine this issue.  Yet, we are bound by Belton .”), cert. denied , 126 S.
Ct. 2053 (2006); United States v. Osife, 398 F.3d 1143, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Jus-
tice Scalia’s view is more analytically sound than the prevailing approach” but that
“[r]egardless of the wisdom of Justice Scalia’s view, we must continue to follow the
Supreme Court’s holdings until they are overruled.”).
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modified the Belton  rule as a matter of state law.79  Those re-
jecting Belton  in favor of Chimel ’s fact-specific inquiry include
Pennsylvania,80 New Mexico,81 Nevada,82 and Wyoming.83  Other
states have placed some limits on searches of automobiles inci-
dent to arrest.  For example, New Jersey does not permit Belton
searches following arrests for traffic offenses84 or after the arres-
tee has been removed from the vehicle and secured elsewhere.85
Massachusetts likewise refuses to permit a Belton  search where
the arrestee has been secured away from the vehicle at the time
the search is conducted.86  And Oregon, while not limiting auto-
mobile searches incident to arrest in order to achieve the twin
goals of preservation of evidence and protection of the officer,
requires that a search within the scope of those justifications
“must be related to the crime for which the person was arrested
79 See  Eugene L. Shapiro, New York v. Belton and State Constitutional Doctrine ,
105 W. VA. L. REV. 131, 141 (2002).
80 See  Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 902 (Pa. 1995) (noting that privacy
interests inherent in the Pennsylvania Constitution limit warrantless automobile
searches incident to arrest “to areas and clothing immediately accessible to the per-
son arrested”).
81 See  State v. Gomez, 932 P.2d 1, 13 (N.M. 1997) (restricting searches of automo-
biles incident to arrest to areas accessible to arrestee in accordance with Chimel).
The Gomez court stated:  “[I]f there is no reasonable  basis for believing an automo-
bile will be moved or its search will otherwise be compromised by delay, then a
warrant is required. . . . [W]e do not accept the federal bright-line automobile excep-
tion.” Id.
82 See  Camacho v. State, 75 P.3d 370, 373-74 (Nev. 2003) (electing “to follow our
previous cases where we rejected Belton ’s reasoning and followed the earlier United
States Supreme Court case of Chimel v. California”) (footnote omitted); State v.
Harnisch, 931 P.2d 1359, 1365-66 (Nev. 1997) (holding that the search incident to
arrest of an automobile is inapplicable where a person is in custody and removed
from the vehicle, because the exception evolves “from the need to disarm and pre-
vent any evidence from being concealed or destroyed”).
83 Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 489 (Wyo. 1999) (rejecting Belton ’s bright-line
approach in favor of a fact-specific Chimel  approach, but expanding the permissible
search to include a search for evidence relevant to the arrestee’s arrest even if the
evidence is not in danger of destruction by the arrestee).
84 State v. Pierce, 642 A.2d 947, 961 (N.J. 1994) (observing “that the Belton  rule,
as applied to arrests for traffic offenses, creates an unwarranted incentive for police
officers to ‘make custodial arrests which they otherwise would not make as a cover
for a search which the Fourth Amendment otherwise prohibits’”) (quoting 3
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §7.1(c), at 21 (2d ed. 1987)).
85 State v. Eckel, 888 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 2006) (“Once the occupant of a vehicle
has been arrested, removed and secured elsewhere, the considerations informing the
search incident to arrest exception are absent and the exception is inapplicable.”).
86 See  Commonwealth v. Toole, 448 N.E.2d 1264, 1267-68 (Mass. 1983) (invalidat-
ing search of truck’s passenger compartment incident to arrest on state statutory
grounds where the arrestee had been handcuffed, arrested, and was in the custody of
troopers at the time the search was conducted).
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and must be reasonable in scope, time and intensity.”87
C. What to Do About Belton
In light of the Thornton  concurring opinions, the decisions by
several state courts, and the criticism of scholars, it appears safe
to say that the Belton  rule is under attack and its days are num-
bered.  Given the vast number of reported cases involving Belton
searches that occur after the motorist is arrested, handcuffed, and
in the officer’s custody,88 it is increasingly difficult to justify the
wholesale invasion of a motorist’s privacy interest in the interior
of his automobile merely because he has been arrested when the
twin justifications for a search incident to arrest are utterly ab-
sent.  Furthermore, continued in its current form, Belton  not only
impacts the automobile occupants’ privacy interests, but, as one
judge has recognized, it also creates an incentive on the part of
officers to make an arrest for even minor traffic offenses as a
pretext to justify a search which the Fourth Amendment other-
wise prohibits.89  The potential for abuse is staggering.
But what should be done about Belton?  The proposal by Jus-
tice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg, is interesting but, as noted
above,90 would revive the Rabinowitz  approach to searches inci-
dent to arrest that the Court specifically rejected in Chimel .
Granted, since it recasts only the justification for Belton , which is
a bright-line rule for automobile searches incident to arrest, the
proposal would apply only to automobile searches.  In addition,
it would have the beneficial effect of eliminating searches that
87 State v. Brody, 686 P.2d 451, 453 (Or. Ct. App. 1984); see also  State v. Kirsch,
686 P.2d 446, 448 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (“Belton  is not the law of Oregon.”).
88 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 628 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (noting that Belton  searches occurring after the motorist has been ar-
rested “are legion”).  For a sampling of reported federal cases involving this precise
scenario, see United States v. Wesley , 293 F.3d 541, 544 (D.C. Cir. 2002); United
States v. Humphrey , 208 F.3d 1190, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Mitchell ,
82 F.3d 146, 152 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Moorehead , 57 F.3d 875, 878 (9th
Cir. 1995); Richardson v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs , No. 04-0351-CV-W-RED, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 576, at *3-4 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 2006); United States v. Brown , 261
F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2003), rev’d , 374 F.3d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 2004); and United
States v. Patrick , No. 02-20099-01-JWL, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9228, at *2-4 (D.
Kan. May 30, 2003).  Many state court decisions are in accord. See, e.g. , State v.
Haught, 831 P.2d 946, 947 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992); State v. Edgington, 487 N.W.2d
675, 676 (Iowa 1992); State v. White, 489 N.W.2d 792, 793 (Minn. 1992); State v.
Hensel, 417 N.W.2d 849, 853 (N.D. 1988).
89 Pierce , 642 A.2d at 961.
90 See supra  notes 67-75 and accompanying text. R
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-4\ORE402.txt unknown Seq: 16 17-MAY-07 11:51
928 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85, 913
lack probable cause but are incident to an arrest when it is un-
likely that evidence related to the arrest will be discovered by the
search, such as where a motorist has been arrested for a traffic
violation.  But in view of the clear message in Chimel  that an
arrest does not justify searching an area beyond the immediate
control of the arrestee and that “[s]uch searches, in the absence
of well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under the au-
thority of a search warrant,”91 an attempt to recast Belton  as
grounded upon the rejected Rabinowitz  rationale rather than
upon Chimel  would permit searches of automobiles in the ab-
sence of either probable cause or the twin justifications underly-
ing Chimel .  It is hard to support this approach to Belton  when
there is a much more straightforward way to restore privacy in-
terests to automobiles and still safeguard legitimate law enforce-
ment interests.
As a first step, Belton  must go rather than be recast with a
different rationale in support thereof. Belton ’s purpose was to
create a bright-line rule to more easily apply Chimel  in the con-
text of an arrest of an automobile occupant.92  It is not clear that
it is any more difficult to apply the “immediate control area” test
of Chimel  to an arrest of an automobile occupant than to an ar-
restee in any other context.  But it is clear that the Belton  case
itself stretched the search incident to arrest justifications beyond
where they were plausible:  the vehicle’s occupants were outside
the vehicle at the time of the search, and the “container”
searched was the zippered pocket of a jacket on the backseat of a
car,93 an area clearly beyond the control of the car’s former occu-
pants.  The fact that several state courts expressly reject Belton
and instead apply Chimel  to automobile searches incident to ar-
rest94 belies the contention that the Chimel  rule is particularly
difficult to apply in the context of arrests of automobile occu-
pants.  There just does not seem to be any reason to permit an
unnecessary rule to continue to erode our Fourth Amendment
interests.
Having demonstrated that automobile searches incident to ar-
rest under Belton  are rarely, if ever, sustainable under the twin
rationales of Chimel , Justice Scalia notes that if they are justifia-
91 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
92 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
93 Id.  at 456.
94 See supra  notes 79-87 and accompanying text. R
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ble at all, it is “because the car might contain evidence relevant
to the crime for which he was arrested.”95  The mere remote pos-
sibility that the car might contain evidence relevant to a crime
would justify neither the issuance of a warrant nor the use of the
automobile exception, because both require probable cause.
However, it is often the case that the facts giving rise to probable
cause to arrest may also provide probable cause to believe that
the automobile contains evidence related to the occupant’s crimi-
nal activity.  In that situation, Belton  is not needed at all.  A sep-
arate exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement,
the Carroll  doctrine, is well suited to govern that situation.  As
we shall see, however, that too is a doctrine in need of reexami-
nation and modification to fit changing technologies and circum-
stances if the Fourth Amendment is to continue to provide any
expectation of privacy in the context of automobiles.96
In summary, the Fourth Amendment can more faithfully be
observed in the context of automobiles if Belton ’s bright-line rule
is eliminated in favor of the straightforward application of
Chimel ’s search-incident-to-arrest rule.  Because the facts giving
rise to probable cause to arrest a vehicle’s occupant will often
give rise to probable cause to believe that the car contains con-
traband or fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of the criminal
activity for which the arrest was made, the officers may be justi-
fied in searching under the automobile exception of Carroll .  But
should Carroll  continue to stand as it now does?
II
REWORKING THE CARROLL RULE TO RESTORE
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
FOR AUTOMOBILES
Even older than the Belton  rule is the Carroll  doctrine, which
permits warrantless searches of automobiles based upon proba-
ble cause to believe the car contains contraband or fruits, instru-
mentalities, or evidence of criminal activity.  This rule was first
articulated by the Supreme Court in 1925 in Carroll v. United
States .97  In that case, the Court’s approval of the immediate war-
rantless search of an automobile rested on the exigent circum-
95 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 629 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
96 See infra Part II.
97 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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stance that “it [was] not practicable to secure a warrant because
the vehicle [could] be quickly moved out of the locality or juris-
diction in which the warrant [was] sought.”98  The Court thus cre-
ated a bright-line rule presuming an exigency because of the
automobile’s mobility.99
A. The Expanded “Justification” for the  Carroll Doctrine
Although the Carroll  automobile exception began as a bright-
line application of the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement, roughly half a century later the Court ar-
ticulated a second justification for the rule:  people have a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy in their automobiles.100  In
announcing the reduced expectation of privacy in automobiles,
the Court cited several considerations:  automobiles are operated
on the open highway,101 they must be licensed,102 and they are
periodically required to undergo official inspections and are
sometimes “taken into police custody in the interests of public
safety.”103
The conclusion that people have a reduced expectation of pri-
vacy in their automobiles, and that this somehow makes an im-
mediate warrantless search of the automobile reasonable, is
based upon flawed logic.  While the fact that automobiles are op-
erated on the open highway may diminish the privacy interest in
areas that are exposed to public view—such as the interior of a
passenger compartment, which may be viewed through a win-
dow—the mere operation of the automobile on a public highway
cannot reduce one’s expectation of privacy in portions of the ve-
hicle or closed containers therein that are not exposed to the
public view, such as the automobile trunk, closed glove box, or
area under the seats.  Nor does the fact that automobiles must be
licensed, are regulated, are subject to periodic inspections, and
are occasionally taken into police custody for safety reasons sup-
port an assertion that the expectation of privacy one has in one’s
98 Id.  at 153.
99 See id. ; see also  Carol A. Chase, Privacy Takes a Back Seat:  Putting the Auto-
mobile Exception Back on Track After Several Wrong Turns , 41 B.C. L. REV. 71, 73-
74 (1999).
100 See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977); see also Chase, supra
note 99, at 75-77. R
101 Chadwick , 433 U.S. at 12 (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)
(plurality opinion)).
102 Id.  at 12-13.
103 Id. at 13.
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automobile is reduced.  It is a tremendous stretch to base a re-
duced expectation of privacy on vehicle licensing requirements,
which consist of registering it to an owner and payment of a
fee.104  Further, the types of regulations commonly placed upon
automobiles, such as speed limits, driver qualifications, safety
standards, or emissions standards, do not have any rational bear-
ing upon the privacy of, for example, the automobile’s trunk or
any closed containers found in the vehicle.105  And, while it is
true that automobiles may be required to undergo periodic offi-
cial inspections, these inspections are not wholesale searches of
the automobile and its contents but rather are narrowly tailored
to non-law-enforcement purposes, such as to ensure the proper
functioning of automobile emissions equipment106 or certain au-
tomobile safety equipment.107  Finally, although the Court cited
the fact that automobiles can be taken “into police custody in the
interests of public safety” as a justification for announcing that
people enjoy a reduced expectation of privacy in their automo-
biles,108 the same can be said of virtually any moveable property.
Indeed, it is sometimes necessary for reasons of public safety for
government agents to secure and inspect even residential prop-
erty, as in the immediate aftermath of an earthquake or fire.109
But the mere possibility  that this may occur should not diminish
an expectation of privacy in an automobile any more than it
would do so with respect to a residence.  Thus, the factors cited
in support of the Court’s pronouncement that we have a reduced
expectation of privacy in automobiles simply do not justify that
conclusion.
Nonetheless, it must be recognized that the mere declaration
by the Court that we have a reduced expectation of privacy in
104 See, e.g. , CAL. VEH. CODE § 4150 (West 2000); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-
415 (West Supp. 2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 301.020 (West Supp. 2006); N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. LAW § 401 (McKinney Supp. 2007); see also  Chase, supra  note 99, at 89-93. R
105 See  Chase, supra  note 99 at 90-91.
106 See, e.g. , CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44011 (West 2006); N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. LAW § 301 (McKinney Supp. 2007); see also  Chase, supra  note 99, at 90-91. R
107 See, e.g. , CAL. VEH. CODE § 2814 (West 2000); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 375
(McKinney Supp. 2007); see also  Chase, supra  note 99, at 91-92. R
108 See Chadwick , 433 U.S. at 13.
109 See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293 (1984) (noting that a burning build-
ing “creates an exigency that justifies a warrantless entry”); Michigan v. Tyler, 436
U.S. 499, 509-12, (1978) (upholding warrantless search of burned building shortly
after fire and invalidating subsequent searches “detached from the initial exigency
and warrantless entry”); United States v. Parr, 716 F.2d 796, 812-13 (11th Cir. 1983);
see also  Chase, supra  note 99, at 92. R
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our automobiles has an undeniable cyclical effect:  if the highest
Court tells us that we cannot expect privacy in our automobiles,
then we cannot reasonably claim to have an expectation of pri-
vacy in our automobiles.  The legal pronouncement itself affects
the reasonableness of our expectations, which, in turn, affects the
permissible scope of governmental intrusions.  Thus, rather than
measuring our expectation of privacy, the Court is determining it.
Katz v. United States110  redefined the scope of protection con-
ferred by the Fourth Amendment to that which an individual
seeks to preserve as private.111  But it was Justice Harlan’s articu-
lated view in his concurring opinion that has become the legal
standard.112  According to Justice Harlan, the Fourth Amend-
ment confers a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation
of privacy if two requirements are met.  First, the individual must
have an actual, subjective expectation of privacy,113 which many
people likely have in their automobiles.  Second, the expectation
of privacy must be one that society recognizes as reasonable,114
which is something that can hardly be claimed once the Court has
declared otherwise.  The effect of the Court declaring a reduced
expectation in automobiles is that the mere declaration reduces
the expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.
The reduced expectation of privacy can then be used as one basis
for holding it is reasonable to perform an immediate warrantless
search.115
Where might this road take us?  Can the Court, in, say, a five-
to-four decision, announce that we have no  expectation of pri-
vacy in our automobiles so that, just as it is reasonable for cus-
110 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
111 Id.  at 351.
112 See  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001); Minnesota v. Carter, 525
U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the Katz  test “has come to
mean the test enunciated by Justice Harlan’s separate concurrence in Katz”); Flor-
ida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 456 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice
Harlan in Katz); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-81 (1983) (citing Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 & n.12 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)).
113 Katz , 389 U.S. at 361.
114 Id.
115 See, e.g. , United States v. Matthews, 32 F.3d 294, 299 (7th Cir. 1994) (deter-
mining that under the automobile exception “the diminished expectation of privacy
alone is sufficient to conduct a search on probable cause”); see also California v.
Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985) (applying the automobile exception to search a
mobile home and declaring that “[e]ven in cases where an automobile was not im-
mediately mobile, the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a readily
mobile vehicle justified application of the vehicular exception”).
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toms officials to make warrantless, suspicionless searches at a
border,116 officers can make warrantless, suspicionless searches
of automobiles?  Or might this road lead us to a decision by the
Court that the diminished expectation of privacy, coupled with a
“special need”117 of law enforcement—such as the need to en-
hance public safety prompted by the dangers presented by drive-
by shootings or other automobile-related misconduct—will jus-
tify a search based on less than probable cause, as is permitted in
the context of public schoolchildren based upon reasonable sus-
picion118 or even without regard to suspicion?119  It may seem
far-fetched, but once we are on a road that diminishes our expec-
tation of privacy in a certain thing or place, there may be no con-
venient stopping point short of the complete elimination of our
expectation of privacy in that thing or place.  Then our automo-
biles may be subject to a search at any time for no reason at all,
much as we are subject to searches when we seek to board com-
mercial flights.
Undoubtedly more crime would be discovered and criminals
apprehended if police are given unfettered discretion to search
automobiles without any particularized suspicion.  The same
would be true if police could search our homes without any par-
ticularized suspicion.  Criminals often use automobiles as well as
their residences as repositories for instrumentalities, fruits, and
evidence of crime.  Indeed, automobiles and residences may even
be instrumentalities of crime.  But permitting warrantless, suspi-
cionless searches in either instance runs counter to our long-held
understanding of what is reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment.  And the invitation to engage in abusive, discriminatory
policing practices that would result presents a strong argument
against traveling down this road.
It is therefore evident that the more recent “reduced expecta-
tion of privacy” justification cited in support of Carroll  has
116 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 617 (1977) (acknowledging that a
border search is reasonable in the absence of a warrant and probable cause).
117 The special needs doctrine permits police to conduct a search on less than
probable cause to further an important interest, or “special need” beyond ordinary
criminal law enforcement. See, e.g. , New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 332 n.2, 341
(1985).
118 Id.  at 341-43 (permitting search of student’s purse based on reasonable suspi-
cion due to student’s reduced expectation of privacy in school and the special need
to assure a safe and healthy learning environment).
119 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837-38 (2002) (permitting suspicionless
random drug testing of schoolchildren involved in extracurricular activities).
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placed us on a dangerous road.  A much safer route can be
achieved by returning to Carroll ’s origins.  Apart from the as-
pects of an automobile that are exposed to the public by virtue of
its operation in public areas and which would be subject to the
plain view doctrine in any event, there appears to be no good
justification for basing an immediate warrantless search of an au-
tomobile on probable cause in combination with a claimed re-
duced expectation of privacy.  The only  appropriate justification
for an immediate warrantless search of an automobile, when
there is probable cause to believe that the automobile contains
contraband or fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of criminal
activity, is found in the original rationale articulated by the Court
in Carroll :  that the exigency presented by mobility justifies an
immediate warrantless search.120
B. An Immediate Warrantless Search May Not Always
Be Necessary
Armed with probable cause to believe that a vehicle contained
alcoholic beverages illegal in the Prohibition era, the officers in
Carroll  faced a situation that presented only two alternatives:
obtain a search warrant, which would run a near-certain risk that
the automobile would have been moved in the time it would take
to obtain a search warrant,121 or perform an immediate warrant-
less search of the vehicle.122  The holding in Carroll  specifically
notes the risk that the vehicle could be moved from the jurisdic-
tion before a warrant could be obtained.123  This implies that the
prolonged seizure, which would have been required in the early
years of the twentieth century to immobilize the vehicle and its
occupants pending the issuance of a warrant, would not have
been considered a reasonable alternative under the Fourth
Amendment.
With the passage of time, however, new technologies have de-
veloped, which changes the range of options available in a Car-
roll -type situation.  Today, telephonic search warrants are
available federally124 and in a growing number of states.125  The




124 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(3)(A).
125 See , e.g. , CAL. PENAL CODE § 1526 (West 2000); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4404
(2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-5-8 (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-221
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availability of cellular telephones and portable fax machines in
patrol vehicles now means that search warrants can be obtained
in jurisdictions that authorize telephonic search warrants much
more quickly than was possible in the early twentieth century,
when Carroll was decided.  Although the need for immediate ac-
tion may preclude seeking even a telephonic search warrant,
where telephonic search warrants are authorized they may be ob-
tained quickly, sometimes in less than an hour.126  This changes
the range and balance of options available to officers who come
upon an automobile for which they have probable cause to
search.  If telephonic search warrants are available in the jurisdic-
tion, it may be more reasonable to briefly seize the automobile
pending the issuance of a search warrant than to perform an im-
mediate warrantless search.  And if this is the case, then the exi-
gency presented by the mobility of the automobile should not
justify an immediate warrantless search of the automobile.
Not only has technology diminished the time needed to obtain
a search warrant, but the law has developed in a direction favor-
ing a brief seizure to maintain the status quo pending the arrival
of a search warrant.  In Illinois v. McArthur,127  the Supreme
Court approved the seizure of a residence for approximately two
hours pending the arrival of a search warrant.128  In McArthur,
the police had probable cause to believe there were drugs inside
a residence.129  They also had reason to fear that the drugs would
be destroyed before they could return with a warrant; moreover,
the owner had refused to consent to a search of his home.130  In
those circumstances, the Court approved the police officers’ tem-
(2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179.045(2) (LexisNexis 2006); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 690.36 (McKinney 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.545(6) (2005); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 23A-35-4 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-204 (2003); WASH. SUP. CT.
CRIM. R. 2.3(c); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.12(3) (West 2007). But see White v. State,
842 So. 2d 565, 569-70 (Miss. 2003) (holding search to be construed as a warrantless
search because “Mississippi has yet to recognize the viability of telephonic
warrants”).
126 See United States v. Morgan, 744 F.2d 1215, 1222 (6th Cir. 1984) (recognizing
telephonic search warrants but holding that exigent circumstances existed to allow a
reasonable search when government agents had only a half hour to an hour to con-
duct a search); United States v. Baker, 520 F. Supp. 1080, 1084 (S.D. Iowa 1981)
(stating that telephonic search warrants are obtainable in twenty to thirty minutes);
see also  Chase, supra  note 99, at 88. R
127 531 U.S. 326 (2001).
128 Id.  at 332-33.
129 Id.  at 331-32.
130 Id.  at 332.
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porary restraint on the home and its occupant, which required
the occupant to remain outside his home unless a police officer
accompanied him inside.131  The Court held that the restraint im-
posed by the officers “was both limited and tailored reasonably
to secure law enforcement needs while protecting privacy inter-
ests.  In [the Court’s] view, the restraint met the Fourth Amend-
ment’s demands.”132
These developments make it possible to limit Carroll , but why
is it necessary to do so?  The short answer is that Carroll  needs to
be limited, in addition to Belton  being eliminated, in order to
restore Fourth Amendment protections to the automobile, as
well as to other moveable property, and to minimize the poten-
tial for abusive police practices.
While the Fourth Amendment itself is silent concerning the
circumstances under which a search warrant is required before
government officials have authority to search, the Supreme
Court has had much to say about that issue.  The Court has long
interpreted the Fourth Amendment to require that a valid search
warrant issued by a judge or magistrate is a requisite to a lawful
search, subject to a few exceptions.133  The Court has recognized
the warrant requirement to be an essential part of the protection
of individual privacy conferred by the Fourth Amendment, a pro-
tection that the Court has stated “consists in requiring that those
inferences [supporting probable cause] be drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.”134  The exceptions applicable to criminal law enforce-
ment activity135 require “exceptional circumstances”136 in which
131 Id.
132 Id.  at 337.
133 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se  unrea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically estab-
lished and well-delineated exceptions.”) (footnote omitted).
134 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
135 The Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches extend be-
yond the context of criminal law enforcement, which is outside the scope of this
Article. See, e.g. , Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837-38 (2002) (regarding drug
testing of students involved in extracurricular activity to further student health and
school discipline concerns); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-700 (1987) (re-
garding inspection of business records and inventory pursuant to administrative
scheme); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (regarding Fourth Amend-
ment limits on health- and safety-related inspections of a residence).
136 Johnson , 333 U.S. at 14.
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the balance of the need for effective law enforcement against the
right of privacy dictates that the warrant requirement may be dis-
pensed with.137  But the Court has never accepted a case-by-case,
ad hoc balance of law enforcement interests against the suspect’s
right of privacy; rather it has recognized “a few specifically estab-
lished and well-delineated exceptions.”138  In the context of crim-
inal law enforcement, these exceptions to the search warrant
requirement are based upon concerns about safety, as in a search
incident to arrest authorizing an officer to search for weapons
that can be used against the officer,139 or concerns that the
amount of time needed to obtain a warrant will result in frustrat-
ing the purpose of the search by permitting the destruction of
evidence140 or fugitivity of a suspect.141  This became known
as the “exigent circumstances” exception to the warrant
requirement.
The Carroll  doctrine began as a specialized application of the
exigent circumstances notion, in which the Court recognized a
presumption of exigency based upon the mobility of the automo-
bile.142  However, technological developments have reduced the
amount of time it takes to obtain a search warrant.  In addition,
the Court’s endorsement in Illinois v. McArthur  of the reasona-
bleness of a brief seizure pending the issuance of a warrant143
suggests that the balance of law enforcement interests against the
individual’s privacy interest may no longer justify the unlimited
automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant re-
quirement articulated in Carroll .
C. Carroll’s Invitation to Abusive Police Practices
Much has been written about the use of racial profiling in de-
ciding whether to make traffic stops.144  However, racial profiling
may play a role in whether a vehicle is searched, and the relative
ease with which police are permitted to search an automobile
under both Carroll  and Belton  may be a factor in encouraging
137 Id. at 14-15.
138 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
139 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
140 See, e.g. , id. ; see also United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 770 (2d Cir.
1990).
141 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967).
142 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
143 531 U.S. 326, 331-33 (2001).
144 See, e.g. , Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment , 51 VAND. L. REV.
333, 334-54 (1998); Gary Webb, DWB* , ESQUIRE, Apr. 1999, at 118, 126.
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pretextual stops made for the purpose of justifying a search.  The
Rand Corporation145 found that in a study of 7607 police stops in
Oakland, California, black drivers, who comprised 50% of all
stopped drivers during the day and 54% of all stopped drivers
during the night, accounted for 75% of all searches performed
during a stop, 85% of which were “low-discretion” searches such
as searches incident to arrest.146
Carroll , which permits warrantless searches based upon proba-
ble cause, also provides an incentive to search on a hunch.  If an
officer searches a vehicle under Carroll  and finds nothing, it is
unlikely that the driver will have a forum in which to protest his
treatment.  However, if the search does yield contraband, then it
will be easier to convince a judge that probable cause existed to
support the search than it may have been to convince a judge
before the search that an officer’s hunch amounted to probable
cause.  Thus, like Belton , Carroll  permits and possibly even en-
courages abusive police practices.
Accepting that it is necessary to modify the Carroll  doctrine,
what changes need to be made?
D. Recasting  Carroll to Restore Privacy
Given the changes in law and technology that undermine the
justifications for Carroll , and the potential for abuse that Carroll
has created, we must now consider how Carroll  may be modified
to protect the privacy interests of automobile occupants while
furthering legitimate law enforcement interests.  Returning to the
language of the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasona-
ble searches and seizures,147 one must ask whether, in view of the
current ability in many jurisdictions to obtain search warrants
relatively quickly (as compared with 1925 when Carroll  was de-
cided), it will always be reasonable for police to conduct an im-
mediate warrantless search rather than to briefly seize an
automobile pending the issuance of a search warrant.  In most
circumstances the answer will be “no.”  A brief seizure of an au-
tomobile does not compromise any privacy interest beyond any
that may have been compromised by the stop itself—that is,
145 Assessing Racial Profiling More Credibly:  A Case Study of Oakland, Califor-
nia , PUB. SAFETY & JUST. BRIEF (Rand Corp., Santa  Monica, Cal.), 2004, at 1-2,
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9070/RAND_RB9070.pdf.
146 Id.
147 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-4\ORE402.txt unknown Seq: 27 17-MAY-07 11:51
2006] Cars, Cops, and Crooks 939
bringing a greater part of the automobile within the plain view of
the officers.  To be sure, the possessory interest of the operator of
the vehicle is compromised, as he may not freely use his automo-
bile while it is seized.  And his personal liberty is also interfered
with, because a seizure of an automobile necessarily seizes its oc-
cupants.  Yet those interests can be fully restored to the operator
of the automobile upon the termination of the seizure.  On the
other hand, once the occupant’s expectation of privacy has been
compromised by the search of the vehicle, that privacy interest
cannot be restored.  The police cannot “unlearn” what they have
learned during the course of the search; the privacy interests that
had existed are now irrevocably violated.
Similar to a search, an infringement of the possessory and lib-
erty interests of the automobile’s occupants caused by a seizure
of an automobile is also protected against by the Fourth Amend-
ment.148  But a rule permitting a brief seizure pending the arrival
of a search warrant increases Fourth Amendment protections to
the vehicle occupants in the following way:  if the occupant val-
ues her possessory and liberty interests in the vehicle more than
she does her privacy interest, that occupant remains free to con-
sent to an immediate search, which will lessen the duration of the
seizure to that which already exists under the current Carroll
rule—that is, the time it takes to search the vehicle.  If, on the
other hand, the individual values her privacy interests in the vehi-
cle more highly than she does her right to use her vehicle to be
on her way, then the occupant can await the result of the applica-
tion for a search warrant.
Carroll  should be modified to permit a brief warrantless
seizure of an automobile based upon probable cause to believe
that the automobile contains contraband or fruits, instrumentali-
ties, or evidence of criminal activity.  This restores the protection
of the Fourth Amendment to automobiles by observing the stan-
dard demanded by the Amendment as construed by the Court:
that the decision as to whether probable cause to search exists be
made by a neutral and detached magistrate rather than by an
officer who is “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime.”149  It also permits the individual operating
the vehicle—one of “the people” protected by the Fourth
Amendment—to consent to an immediate search of the automo-
148 Id .
149 United States v. Johnson, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-4\ORE402.txt unknown Seq: 28 17-MAY-07 11:51
940 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85, 913
bile if he values his right to use his vehicle more highly than his
expectation of privacy in the automobile.  After all, the Fourth
Amendment was intended to confer protections on “the people,”
and so it seems more reasonable to permit those people, rather
than the police, to decide which rights they hold paramount.
It must be recognized that, even if Carroll  is modified to per-
mit a brief seizure rather than an immediate warrantless search,
circumstances may exist which nevertheless require  an immedi-
ate search.  This would be the case, for example, if officers have
probable cause to believe the vehicle contains an armed explo-
sive device or if a kidnapping victim is believed to be concealed
in the trunk of an automobile.  It may also be justifiable to per-
form an immediate search if officers are in an area in which they
cannot secure the automobile and are facing the likelihood of
criminal force being used against them.  Clearly, these situations
present examples of exigent circumstances that would permit an
immediate search of the vehicle.150  The distinction is that, under
Carroll , the right to an immediate warrantless search of an auto-
mobile would no longer be automatically presumed upon the ex-
istence of probable cause.  Rather, specific facts shown to exist
on a case-by-case basis would permit an immediate search pursu-
ant to the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement.
CONCLUSION
The roadmap to restoring our expectation of privacy in our au-
tomobiles will require two changes to existing legal doctrine.
First, the bright-line rule of New York v. Belton , permitting the
warrantless search of the passenger area of an automobile inci-
dent to the arrest of a recent occupant, must be abandoned in
favor of a case-by-case application of Chimel v. California .  This
will restrict the search incident to arrest of the automobile to
those areas from which, at the time of the search, the arrestee
could gain access to a weapon or to evidence of criminal activity.
No longer would there be any lawful justification for conducting
a search of the passenger area while the arrestee is handcuffed
150 And, in some jurisdictions that do not authorize telephonic or facsimile search
warrants, the time needed to obtain a warrant may be so great as to render the
prolonged seizure unreasonable.  In this situation, the immediate warrantless search
may be preferable, at least until a procedure for telephonic or facsimile search war-
rants is in place.
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and seated in a police cruiser or after the arrestee has been re-
moved from the area where the automobile is located.
Second, the automatic rule of United States v. Carroll  granting
law enforcement officers the right to perform an immediate war-
rantless search of an automobile based upon probable cause
must be revised to permit the seizure of the automobile pending
arrival of a search warrant.  This supports the automobile opera-
tor’s privacy interest in his vehicle and allows him to choose to
consent to an immediate warrantless search if, from his point of
view, his right to drive away trumps his expectation of privacy in
his vehicle.  Under this modification to Carroll , police would still
be able to perform an immediate warrantless search when an ac-
tual exigency so requires, but it would no longer be an automatic
part of the Carroll  automobile exception.
Both Belton  and Carroll  have created detours that have dimin-
ished the Fourth Amendment protection for one of our “effects”
under the Fourth Amendment:  our automobiles.  By taking the
steps outlined in this Article, the Court can work toward restor-
ing that privacy interest while still respecting the legitimate needs
of law enforcement.
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